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1 Introduction
A frequent belief about I/O logic is that it presupposes classical proposi-
tional logic. This is clearly a misunderstanding. It is true that in their
seminal paper Makinson and van der Torre [4] found it more convenient to
build I/O logic on top of classical logic. One reason why is that it is a simple
and well-defined framework. However in the study [6] we have shown the
base logic can also be intuitionistic propositional logic. Three of the four
standard I/O operations defined by Makinson and van der Torre are covered.
It is shown that the axiomatic characterizations available for them hold also
for intuitionistic logic. Of course, some important changes must be made
to the semantics. In particular, the role played by maximal consistent set
is now played by the notion of saturated set. In [5] the second author goes
one step further, and shows that the intuitionistic analog of the so-called
“basic” I/O operation out2 has a modal translation into de Paiva’s system
of constructive modal logic CK [2].
In this note we investigate if one can use an algebraic setting instead
of a logic setting. The main result obtained so far concerns the simple-
minded output operation out1. First, we show how to define it within this
new set-up. Second, we argue that all that is needed to get a complete
axiomatization is to be in a lattice. In terms of connectives, this means
that only conjunction is required. This is truly a generalization of the initial
set-up. For classical logic corresponds to the special case of a lattice that is
a boolean algebra. This one could equally be an Heyting algebra.
The interesting thing about algebras is that they allow us to approach
I/O logic from a geometrical point of view. An algebra is mainly about
moving from points to points along a relation ≥. The travelling always
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goes in the upwards direction. We can think of the set G of generators
used in I/O logic as “jump” points or bridges. A pair (a, x) ∈ G is an
instruction to deviate from a path that would be normally taken. Once we
have reached node a, instead of continuing up we jump to an unrelated node
x and continue your journey upwards.
There is a connection with the Lindhal algebraic approach to normative
systems (see beginning of section 3).
2 Background
We start with some background.
Definition 1 (Lattice). A lattice is a structure 〈L,≥,∧, 0, 1〉 where
i) L is a set of points, a, b, ...
ii) ≥⊆ L× L is reflexive and transitive
iii) 0 and 1 are the bottom and top element respectively
iv) any two elements a and b have a greatest lower bound or infimum or
meet (denoted by a ∧ b) defined by
a ∧ b = inf(a, b) = max{z | z ≤ a& z ≤ b}
For “ inf(a, b)” read “the infimum of {a, b}”. The above definition is for
pairs, but can easily be generalized to sets of arbitrary size:
inf A = max{x : ∀y (y ∈ A → x ≤ y}
Note that the infimum of the emptyset is 1. This is because, for A = ∅, the
implication y ∈ A→ x ≤ y holds for any x ∈ L, and thus inf A = maxL.
An ordered set that has properties iii) and iv) is usually called a lattice.1
If x ≤ y, we say that x is below y (or y is above x).
The notation “↑ a” will be for the upset of a, viz {x : a ≤ x}.
The function G(.) (which is a characteristic part of I/O logic) takes a
subset A of L as argument, and delivers the set of points to which we can
“jump” starting from these elements:
G(A) = {x | (a, x) ∈ G for some a ∈ A} (Jump)
1Cf. [1, p.75].
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Before redefining the input/output operations using this apparatus, we
need to clarify what the counterpart of the consequence relation Cn is within
this set-up. When the premisses set is a single point a in the algebra, it is
okay to identify Cn with ≥, and say that the consequences of a are just
all the points above it. But this leaves unanswered the question of what
the consequences of a set of formulae (or points) are. Our suggestion is to
identify Cn(A) with the upset of the infimum of A, ↑ inf A. For instance, if
A = {a, b}, the analogue of the consequence set of A is ↑ inf{a, b} =↑ a ∧ b.
Note that a set A bounded from above may not have an infimum. This
is because the ordering is a partial order. So it may happen that, amongst
the lower bounds of A, none is greater than all the others. This is illustrated
with Figure 1. Put A = {a3, a4}. The lower bounds are a1, a2, and 0. None
is maximal, and so inf A = ∅ even though A is bounded from above by 0.
This possibility is ruled out by condition iv) in Definition 1.
Figure 1: L = {1, 0, a1, a2, a3, a4}
0
a1 a2
a3 a4
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Throughout the remainder of this note we work with a finite L (and a
finite G).
We record for future reference the following facts about infimum. Intu-
itively, lemma 1 says that if A is a subset of B, then the infimum of B is
necessarily below the infimum of A.
Lemma 1. If A ⊆ B, then inf B ≤ inf A.
Proof. Assume A ⊆ B. We have inf(A) ≥ x for all x that are below each
and every element of A. Since A ⊆ B, inf B is below each and every element
of A. Therefore inf B ≤ inf A as required.
Lemma 2. If x ≤ a1,..., and x ≤ an, then x ≤ inf(a1, ..., an).
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Proof. Assume that x is below all the ai’s. By definition, inf(a1, ..., an) is
above any point y that is below all the ai’s. Therefore, inf(a1, ..., an) is
above x.
We are now ready to show that the analogues of the Tarskian properties
for Cn hold for ↑ inf; hence the idea of using one for the other.
Observation 1 (Tarskian properties). We have
i) A ⊆↑ inf A (inclusion)
ii) If A ⊆ B then ↑ inf A ⊆↑ inf B (monotony)
iii) ↑ inf ↑ inf A =↑ inf A (idempotence)
Proof. For inclusion, let a ∈ A. By definition of infimum, inf A ≤ a since
a ∈ A. So a ∈↑ inf A.
For monotony, assume A ⊆ B, and let a ∈↑ inf A. The former means
inf A ≤ a. By lemma 1, inf B ≤ inf A. By transitivity of ≤, inf B ≤ a, and
thus a ∈↑ inf B as required.
The right-in-left inclusion of idempotence is just inclusion. For the left-
in-right inclusion, let x ∈↑ inf ↑ inf A. Since L is finite , x ∈↑ inf(a1, ..., an)
where ↑ inf A = {a1, ..., an}. So inf(a1, ..., an) ≤ x and inf A ≤ ai for all
i = 1, ..., n. By Lemma 2, inf A ≤ inf(a1, ..., an). By transitivity of ≤,
inf A ≤ x as required.
3 Geometrical simple-minded 2
3.1 Analogy with the Lindahl-Odelstal algebraic approach
We start wih the analogy between I/O logic and the Lindahl-Odelstal al-
gebraic approach to normative systems (see, e.g., [3]). It puts things in
perspective. They call their model the “cis-model”, where “cis” abbreviates
conceptual implicative structures. There a normative system is viewed as
consisting of a system B1 of potential grounds (or descriptive conditions),
and a system B2 of potential consequences (or normative effects). The set
of norms are the set J of links or joinings from the system of grounds to
the system of consequences. The cis-model is illustrated in Figure 2, where
a norm is represented by an arrow from one system to the other. There is
here an obvious connection with the simple-minded output operation out1
described in [4]. Recall the calculation of out1 involves three main steps.
2The name “simple-minded” is from Makinson and van der Torre [4]
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Potential grounds (B1)
Joinings (J)
Figure 2: The cis-model
First, input set A is expanded to its classical closure Cn(A). This corre-
sponds to the fact that grounds are ordered by an implication relation in
the cis-model. Next, the set obtained at step 1 is passed into a “black box”,
which delivers the corresponding deontic output. This is done by taking the
image of Cn(A) under G. This is exactly what Lindahl and Odelstal call
“joining”. Finally, the set of ouputs obtained at step 2 is expanded to its
classical closure again. This last step corresponds to the fact that deontic
consequences are also ordered by an implicative relation.
The above gives an idea of what a geometrical view of out1 can be. It
remains to fill in the details.
3.2 Definition and result
Below we reformulate the simple-minded output operation using lattices.
Definition 2 (Simple-minded I/O).
out1(G,A) =↑ inf(G(↑ inf(A))
This definition mirrors the definition given in [4]:
out1(G,A) = Cn(G(Cn(A))
There are three steps involved in the construction:
• Determine the upset of the infimum of A − this corresponds to the
step Cn(A);
• Apply G to the set obtained at step 1, viz. collect the nodes x to
which a jump is allowed − this corresponds to the step G(Cn(A));
• Take the upset of the infimum of the jump points obtained at step 2
− this corresponds to the step Cn(G(Cn(A)));
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In the particular case where the input set is singleton a, inf a = a. This
follows from reflexivity of ≥. So definition 2 simplifies into:
out1(G, a) =↑ inf(G(↑ a))
Below we give some examples where we relax the assumption L be finite.
This is for illustration purpose only.
Example 3. Let G = {(p1, p2)}, where p1 and p2 are two propositional let-
ters. L1 is the lattice of all the wffs generated from p1 and p2. out1(G, {p1})
is the set of wffs that can be proved from p2.
Example 4. Consider the set N of positive integers ordered by the divisibility
relation |. The supremum and the infimum are given by the greatest common
divisor and the least common multiple, respectively. G can be any function
from N to N, e.g. the single-valued successor function S, which adds the
value 1 to any number. out1(G,x) is the set of all the numbers that the
successor of x divides. Turning upside down the lattice, out1(G,x) is the set
of all the divisors of the successor of x.
Below we show that definition 2 validates the rules that are characteristic
of the simple minded operaton.
Observation 2 (SI and WO). If out1 is taken as in definition 2, then out1
validates SI and WO thus reformulated
(SI)
(a, x) b ≤ a
(b, x)
(WO)
(a, x) x ≤ y
(a, y)
Proof. This basically follows from the transitivity of ≤.
For SI, assume x ∈ out1(G, a) and b ≤ a. Let x1, ..., xn be the bodies of
the rules in G that make x ∈ out1(G, a) true. From definition x1, ..., xn ∈↑ a.
By transitivity of ≤, x1, ..., xn ∈↑ b, which suffices for x ∈ out1(G, b).
The argument for WO is just symmetrical to that for SI. Assume x ∈
out1(G, a) and x ≤ y. Let z be the infimum of {b1, ..., bn}, where b1, ..., bn are
the heads of the rules in G that make x ∈ out1(G, a) true. From definition,
x ∈↑ z. By transitivity of ≥, y ∈↑ z, which suffices for y ∈ out1(G, a).
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SI and WO are two of the three rules that are characteristic of the ac-
count of out1 as described in [4]. The last one is
(AND)
(a, x) (a, y)
(a, x ∧ y)
The argument for AND is more involved. For the sake of clarity we pro-
ceed in two steps, and prove first a qualified form of the rule, the restriction
being that the pairs to which the rule is applied appear explicitly in G.
Observation 3 (Restricted AND). Suppose (a, x), (a, y) ∈ G. Assume out1
is taken as in definition 2. We have x, y ∈ out1(G, a), but also x ∧ y ∈
out1(G, a).
Proof. We have x ∈ out1(G, a), because x ∈ G(↑ a) and infG(↑ a) ≤ x. The
argument for x ∈ out1(G, a) is similar. We now show x ∧ y ∈ out1(G, a).
Clearly x ∧ y ∈↑ inf{x, y}. Since (a, x) and (a, y) are in G, we have x, y ∈
G({a}), viz {x, y} ⊆ G({a}). By monotony for ↑ inf (aka observation 1 (ii))
x ∧ y ∈↑ inf{x, y} ⊆↑ inf G({a}) so x ∧ y ∈ out1(G, a) as required.
The argument for the “restricted AND” rule can be restated informally
as follows. You are in x. You jumped there from point a. You want to know
if you can move to x ∧ y. You go down the ordering until you can see y as
head of another bridge from the same point. If you can see y that way, the
jump is allowed.
Now we show that the rule for AND holds in its plain form. The argu-
ment makes use of Lemmas 1 ands 2.
Observation 4 (Full AND). If out1 is taken as in definition 2, then out1
validates
(AND)
(a, x) (a, y)
(a, x ∧ y)
Proof. Assume x, y ∈ out1(G, a). We want to show x∧y ∈ out1(G, a). From
the assumption we get that G contains bridges of the form
(a1, b1), ..., (an, bn), (d1, c1), ..., (dm, cm)
such that
• a1, ..., an, d1, ..., dm ∈↑ (a) (a is below all the bodies)
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• inf(b1, ..., bn) ≤ x
• inf(c1, ..., cm) ≤ y
By definition x ∧ y ≤ x and x ∧ y ≤ y.
The crux of the argument consists in showing that x ∧ y is above the
infimum of the union of all the heads from which x and y originate, viz
inf(b1, ..., bn, c1, ..., cm) ≤ x ∧ y
This is explained in Figure 3. By Lemma 1, we have
inf(b1, ..., bn, c1, ..., cm) ≤ inf(b1, ..., bn) (1)
inf(b1, ..., bn, c1, ..., cm) ≤ inf(c1, ..., cm) (2)
Figure 3: x ∧ y above the infimum of the union of all the relevant heads
inf(b1, ..., bn, c1, ..., cm)
inf(c1, ..., cm)inf(b1, ..., bn)
b1 bn...
x
c1 cm...
y
x ∧ y
By transitivity,
inf(b1, ..., bn, c1, ..., cm) ≤ x (3)
inf(b1, ..., bn, c1, ..., cm) ≤ y (4)
From Lemma 2 it follows that
inf(b1, ..., bn, c1, ..., cm) ≤ x ∧ y
With this result established, the remaining of the proof is easy. Since
a1, ..., an, d1, ..., dm ∈↑ (a)
we have
b1, ..., bn, c1, ..., cm ∈ G(↑ (a))
But we have just seen that inf(b1, ..., bn, c1, ..., cm) ≤ x ∧ y. So x ∧ y ∈
out1(G, a) as required.
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x ∈ out1(G, a) and (a, x) ∈ out1(G, a) are two different but equiva-
lent ways of saying the same thing. This is what makes the axiomatic
characterization possible. We write (a, x) ∈ deriv1(G), or equivalently
x ∈ deriv1(G, a), to indicate that (a, x) is derivable from G. The formal
definition is as in [4]. A pair (a, x) is said derivable from G iff it is in the
least set that includes G, contains the pair (1, 1), and is closed under the
rules of the system (SI), (WO) and (AND).
Makinson and van der Torre make two extra conventions, which will be
adopted here too. (A, x) is said to be derivable from G iff (a, x) is derivable
from G for some conjunction a = a1 ∧ ... ∧ an of elements in A. They also
understand the conjunction of zero formulae to be a tautology, so that (∅, x)
is derivable from G iff (1, x).
For finite A and G, we have:
Theorem 5 (Soundness). deriv1(G,A) ⊆ out1(G,A)
Proof. Same as in [4].
Corollary 6 (Completeness). out1(G,A) ⊆ deriv1(G,A)
Proof. A re-run of the proof given in [4]. Assume x ∈↑ inf(G(↑ inf(A)). We
need to show that (A, x) is derivable from G.
Case 1: G(↑ inf A) = ∅. In that case x is 1. But (1, 1) is derivable from G.
For any conjunction a = a1 ∧ ...∧ an of elements in A, a ≤ 1. By (SI), (a, 1)
is derivable from G. By definition of derivability, (A, 1) is derivable from G
as required.
Case 2: G(↑ inf A) 6= ∅. So G contains (finitely many) rules of the form
(b1, x1), ..., (bn, xn) such that
• b1, ..., bn ∈↑ inf A
• inf(x1, ..., xn) ≤ x
We have b1, ..., bn ∈↑ inf(a1, ..., ak), where a1, ... ak are all the elements
of A. By definition of derivability, (b1, x1), ..., and (bn, xn) are all derivable
from G. We construct a derivation of (A, x) as follows
(b1, x1)
SI
(inf(a1, ..., ak), x1)
. . . . . .
(bn, xn)
SI
(inf(a1, ..., ak), xn)
AND
(inf(a1, ..., ak), x1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn)
WO
(inf(a1, ..., ak), x)
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inf(a1, ..., ak) is the conjunction of all the elements in A. So from the defi-
nition of derivability it follows that (A, x) is derivable.
The generalization to an input set A and a setG of generators of arbitrary
cardinality is left as a topic for future research.
4 Conclusion and future research
We have described a geometrical account of I/O logic. A soundness and com-
pleteness results was reported for the simplest I/O operation called simple-
minded, and in the finite case only. We end this note by discussing some
topics for future investigation.
4.1 Other I/O operations
How to handle the other I/O operations discussed in [4]?
4.2 Geometrical defaults
We can do geometrical defaults in input output logic. Start with a default
theory (W,D), A default d inD reads: if a is in the theory and it is consistent
that b then let c be in the theory.
d can be read as a tourist travel instruction in the geometry of the the
partial order, as follows: If you are above a and you are not above ¬b then
travel higher in the order until you are also above c. A default extension is
a point where you no longer needs to move. W is your starting point.
This is an informal characterization. One still needs to work out the
formal details.
4.3 Jump back
One could work with two sets of jump points, G1 and G2. Some of the jumps
in G2 undo those made in G1 (G2 goes backwards, but of course it can do
more). How to implement this idea?
4.4 Constraints
The idea is to combine default reasoning and contrary-to-duty (CTD) rea-
soning. When there is a violation, the contrary-to-duty can be given priority
over the primary obligation. This is the standard approach to CTDs in I/O
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logics. To avoid inconsistency, we get rid of the primary obligation. How-
ever, the violation can also be seen an exception, in which case the primary
obligation must be given priority. We need a mechanism to deal with the
two views.
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